One unsolved (or at least, unanswered) problem in Critical Rationalism, is the issue that putative falsifications are themselves fallible, because you are relying on fallible prior knowledge to logically judge that the falsification is legitimate. Critical Rationalists seem not to take Critical Rationalism to its full logical conclusions. If the Critical Rationalist’s falsification attempts are … Continue reading Falsification entails the same regress problem (recursive questioning) that Justification entails
Been doing some reflection. I hope to explain how I think Critical Preference works, along with some questions (criticisms). Critical Preference entails the theory that falsification attempts have real potential (propensity) to falsify those existing theories that happen to be false in the first place, and so theories that are better criticised have lower potential … Continue reading Questions unanswered by the “Critical Preference” heuristic
Critical preference tells us to choose ONE fittest theory and _use_ it as knowledge. Bayesian tells us to choose as MANY of the fittest theories as possible, and _use_ them as knowledge. In this way, Critical Preference is clearly the special case of Bayesian theory where N = 1. (In Bayesian theory, N is the … Continue reading Should knowledge comprise the one best theory, or the many competing theories?
We need to properly understand why “justification / verification / confirmation” is considered undesirable, and not blindly accept that it is always wrong. There are two main logical fallacies that come into play here: (1) Fallacy of asserting the consequent (2) Fallacy of denying the antecedent And their logically valid counterparts: (3) Modus Ponens (4) … Continue reading The shared logical foundations of Bayesianism, Critical Rationalism, and Justificationism